Thursday, October 01, 2026

 The Road Map to a Draft-less UCP [1]

Rupnarayan Bose[2]

“Anything can be achieved in small, deliberate steps. But there are times you need the courage to take a great leap; you can't cross a chasm in two small jumps.” [David Lloyd George]

 

For the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the bill of exchange (BoE) – also called a draft – has been a stumbling block for a long time. Try as one might, the many complications that drafts present to the users of the UCP rules are yet to be resolved in a satisfactory manner. Some trade finance specialists opined that the draft was not a ‘document’ for purposes of examination under a letter of credit subject to UCP600. Other practitioners felt that a draft did not provide any benefit to LC operations. A segment of the trade finance community expressed discomfort at the very mention of ‘draft’. The ICC has neither accepted the draft as a standard requirement, nor have they been successful in casting it out from LC practice. The bill of exchange continues to baffle many in the trade finance industry to this day, presumably because the laws governing bills of exchange in various countries have not been understood well enough by a section of the trade professionals. This article is an attempt to resolve the confusion and place bills of exchange laws and the UCP in their proper perspectives.

Bill of Exchange

The bill of exchange (BoE) is a product of the United Kingdom’s Bills of Exchange Act and other similar laws promulgated around the world based on the UK Act.[3] Section 3 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (UK) defines a bill of exchange (a negotiable instrument):

“A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer.“

Note the words ‘unconditional order’ and ‘to pay ... at … a determinable future time’. The drawee must pay irrespective of any reason that they may think they have to delay or avoid payment. The obligation does not call for the presentment of any circumstantial evidence to establish the right of the holder to receive payment at maturity.

The Act goes on to define a drawer, drawee, payee, transfer, holder for value, holder in good faith, special and general endorsements and so on. These are integral to, and defined by, the BoE Act. The requirement and the process of ‘noting and protesting’ – present in almost all the enactments – are also broadly similar.

A unique feature of the negotiable instrument is that if a person acquires a ‘negotiable instrument’ in good faith and without knowledge of defect in title of the transferor, the transferee can get better title to the negotiable instrument, even if the title of the transferor was defective. (However, a similar status is not accorded to a bill of lading, for instance. A B/L is not a negotiable instrument but rather a quasi-negotiable instrument. The transferee does not get a better title than the one who transferred it by endorsement and delivery,)

Differences in the Acts

Although various enactments on negotiable instruments around the world bear a great degree of similarity, differences exist, especially with reference to the amount in words and figures. In certain jurisdictions, where there is an inconsistency between the two, the lesser of the amounts prevails. In some countries where there is a mismatch, the amount stated in words prevails. However, according to Negotiable Instruments Law of the People's Republic of China[4], “The amount of a negotiable instrument shall be written in both Chinese characters and in numerals and the two shall tally with each other. The negotiable instruments shall be invalid if the words and figures do not tally.” (Article 8)

Article 9 of the same Law of China states: “The items recorded in a negotiable instrument shall conform to the provisions of this law. The amount, date and name of the receiver shall not be altered. If they are altered, the negotiable instrument shall become invalid. Other matters recorded in a negotiable instrument may be altered by the original recorder and the alteration shall be certified by a signature or seal put on it by the original recorder.”

These Articles are quoted to show that first, the laws on the negotiable instruments are the province of the lawmakers of the country concerned; and second, that there is no uniformity among the enactments on this subject among the countries around the world.

Where the laws themselves are not uniform, their implementation could be even more problematic. For example, ISBP 821 paragraph B15 states: “A draft is to be endorsed, if necessary”. Who is to determine when this is necessary and with reference to, or based on, what? To comply with ISBP 821 paragraphs B16 and B17 that follow, one would also have to be aware of the relevant provisions in various jurisdictions worldwide. Is it practical to expect this from a document checker?

Further, ISBP 821 paragraph A11(i) states that “drafts are to indicate a date of issuance”. However, UK Act section 3.4.a and BoE laws of several countries state: “A bill is not invalid by reason [T]hat it is not dated” (or like wording). Can the ISBP, a supplement explaining the UCP rules, prevail over BoE law?

Given this scenario – especially the lack of uniformity in the laws – it would be advisable for the ISBP to avoid commenting on drafts.

1.     The critical advantage of a BoE

Performance under a letter of credit is a contractual obligation.[5] In order to establish its claim, an aggrieved party need to go through the arduous process of presenting circumstantial evidence to prove to a court that (a) there was an agreement or contract to supply certain goods; (b) that supply was duly made and received by the parties concerned to their satisfaction; (c) that payment from the buyer was as scheduled (on demand or at maturity), and (d) that the buyer failed to pay as previously agreed.

By law, the very possession of a duly accepted but unpaid bill of exchange is sufficient evidence to establish the liability or obligation of the buyer to pay a holder. Thus:

“[w]hen a holder in due course is established, this holder is not obliged to provide evidence of the actual basis to claim for the payment of the bills of exchange. Other parties who assume the debt to be defended against a holder in due course are not allowed on a basis of underlying cause.”[6]

This makes transactions between a buyer and seller under the BoE laws quite straightforward. The role of bills of exchange and the rights of a holder in a transaction are clearly established by law. This is irrespective of whether the transaction is further supported by a documentary credit or not.

2.     The applicable rule or law?

As already clarified, negotiable instruments like bills of exchange (drafts) are governed by Bills of Exchange law. Letters of credit, on the other hand, are governed not by any legislation but by the rules created by the ICC. Unlike the laws governing bills of exchange, which are applicable and enforceable whether one is aware of them or not (‘ignorantia juris non excusat’), parties would have to specifically agree to abide by the UCP rules for these to be applicable. Unlike positive law, private rules of practice are applicable only to the extent of which they have been chosen and to which the applicable law gives effect to them.

3.     LC - Sailing in two boats

The presence of a draft among a set of documents presented under a letter of credit creates an immediate conflict. The draft, a negotiable instrument, is an unconditional order to pay the holder at sight or on maturity. Payment under an LC, on the other hand, is conditional, subject to a complying presentation and the UCP rules. Further, under the fraud exception, the issuing bank may obtain judicial relief and not pay. However, under a BoE Act, the issuing bank is still obliged to pay the holder in due course who has no idea that a fraud may have occurred. The dilemma for the issuing bank begins here, because bills of exchange are governed by legislative approval. Legislation supersedes rules at all times.

“When LC requires bills of exchange, there are two types of legal relationships among the issuing bank, the nominated bank and the beneficiary under the LC and the bills of exchange, which are not completely the same. The judicial practices in the LC transactions and the bills of exchange operations are different. The examination standards for the bills of exchange by international standard banking practice … in LC operations such as amounts & corrections are not consistent with relevant provisions of the laws for the bills of exchange, particularly on the regulated format and the contents under various legal jurisdictions”[7]

Therein lies the rub. To start with, it is recommended that draft be removed from LCs available by sight payment. Let such LCs be called: (a) credits available by immediate payment; (b) credits available by payment on demand; or (c) demand credits (these terms being defined by the UCP). In the absence of a draft, ‘LCs available at sight’ (of a draft) does not make sense. That expression could be simultaneously removed.

4.     The BoE Act

The fact is that the vast majority of LC specialists do not understand the finer points of the BoE Act, if they have studied the subject at all. A majority of them do not understand, for example, the difference between a negotiable instrument like a draft or cheque, and a quasi-negotiable instrument like a bill of lading. Many professionals in the industry calling for the end of drafts lack the expertise to comment on the laws applicable to bill of exchange, their relevance (if not their utility) in documentary credit operations, or why LCs and drafts do not mix. This environment prompted the ICC in 2023 to issue its document titled “Additional material relating to the Guidance Paper – the use of drafts under documentary credits prepared by the Executive Committee of the ICC Banking Commission”, a re-release of its 2019 Guidance Paper which opened with the comment: “Market feedback from a number of trade practitioners questioned the on-going requirement for drafts in a documentary credit transaction. Furthermore, it was stated that sight drafts do not provide any benefit.”[8] Fact or fiction? Read on to find out.

Most unfortunately for the ICC, ever since the UCP rules were framed, documentary credits and drafts became inexorably linked. Consequently, the present UCP600 Article 6 describes four types of documentary credits, two of which may or may not require the presence of drafts. The fact that the UCP fails to offer clear definitions for these types of documentary credits is simply because drafts are defined by the BoE Act, not the ICC.

5.     Supremacy of the BoE

Letters of credit are subject to rules framed by the ICC whereas bills of exchange (drafts) are governed by laws under a country’s bills of exchange act.

“The laws and judicial practice for bills of exchange have clear requirements which can clarify easily the rights and obligations of a holder in due course and a holder for value. For example, when a holder in due course is established, this holder is not obliged to provide evidence of the actual basis to claim for the payment of the bills of exchange……

The protection for a holder in due course, by applying the laws for bills of exchange for the non-causal nature prevails over independence principle in LCs under UCP600. Other disputes arising from bills of exchange in a LC transaction, the court [is] also very likely to apply the relevant bills of exchange ordinance instead of LC regulations and law, [from] which could occur uncertainties to the issuing bank, the nominated bank as well as the beneficiary.”[9]

The significance of these observations should not be overlooked.

6.     The use of BoEs

Is a draft essential to export documentation? For documents under collection (collection bills), it is not only necessary but essential. The applicable rules are elucidated in Uniform Rules for Collections (URC), ICC Publication No. 522. The set of collection documents primarily includes an invoice, a transport document, and other documents like a certificate of quality/health and packing list as the case may be. A draft – drawn by the seller (drawer) on the buyer (drawee) and showing the seller’s bank as the payee – sits on top of this neat little pile of documents. Why?

The full set of documents is submitted by the seller to their bank with instructions for onward transmission to the collecting/presenting bank for presentation to the buyer. The buyer is required to pay the presenting bank at sight or accept and pay at maturity. Now ask yourself: If someone turned up at the buyer’s place of business with the aforementioned bundle of documents (without the draft) and demanded payment, which of these documents would give the presenter any authority to (a) demand payment on behalf of the seller; (b) receive payment on behalf of the seller; and (c) give a legal discharge on behalf of the seller for having received full and final payment, thus releasing the buyer of their obligation towards the seller?

None, actually. The documents are mere pieces of paper, possibly drawn to show the buyer as the addressee. However, none accords any legal right to the presenter to demand payment. Only the bill of exchange does by the force of law, which the seller submits along with other documents to their bank (the remitting bank), denoting that bank as the payee on the BoE. The seller issues the bill of exchange showing the remitting bank as the payee. The remitting bank endorses the draft in favour of the collecting/presenting bank. The collecting/presenting bank, having received the bill of exchange by the due process of transfer by ‘endorsement and delivery’ (as defined by the BoE Act), becomes its ‘holder in due course’ (once again, as defined by the BoE Act). Note the unbroken chain. The presenting bank is thus empowered by law to do all that is required under points (a) to (c) in the foregoing paragraph.

7.     Endorsement

Let us examine a variation of the above. In this scenario, the seller endorses the BoE (attached to the other documents covering the shipment) directly in favour of the presenting bank. When the transaction is under a letter of credit, it would be the issuing bank. The set of documents along with the bill of exchange (where the issuing bank is recorded as the payee) is handed over by the beneficiary to the nominated bank for negotiation. The nominated bank forwards the documents to the issuing bank. Question: Before submitting the documents, should the beneficiary endorse the draft in favour of the nominated/negotiating bank?

The answer is that the draft was “issued” (see its meaning in the BoE Act) in favour of the LC issuing bank and handed over to the nominated bank only for “due delivery” (delivery as defined by the BoE Act) to the issuing bank. It was not endorsed in favour of the nominated bank. Therefore, it cannot pass on what it does not have. No further endorsement is necessary. The issuing bank becomes the holder in due course. The chain remains unbroken. Yes, one needs to know the BoE Act to fully appreciate how the law works.

8.     What is deferred payment?

‘Payment at sight or sight payment’ and ‘acceptance’ are products of the BoE Act, which defines these terms. The UCP has not offered any definition for these two expressions. The term ‘deferred payment’ is not defined by the BoE acts, nor by the UCP. According to the ICC, ‘payment by acceptance’ and ‘deferred payment’ are similar – not being payable on demand – but for the absence of drafts in the latter (see ISBP 821 paragraph B6). This impression is wholly incorrect.

Under acceptance credits, the total face value (amount due) is paid in a lump sum within six months to a year, but after a mutually agreed period. Under a deferred payment arrangement, the repayment begins after a moratorium, but is spread over several instalments. Examples are vehicle loans, student loans, or a mortgage.

Consider a project like construction of a power plant, port, railroad, or highway where the investment is a massive amount. Project implementation takes many years. Repayment of the amount borrowed cannot begin until and unless the project is commissioned and starts generating revenue, which may take several more years – dictated by the nature of the project and the terms of the loan agreement. Repayment begins after a gap of time (moratorium) and paid in instalments spread over a decade or more depending on the cash flow. This is known as a deferred payment arrangement.

Suitably worded contracts, bills of exchange, letters of credit – or a combination of all three – are used (subject to the matter of stamp duty in some countries) to bind the borrower and ensure repayment over the “deferred” period. Where the advance is covered by LC, it is called deferred payment credit.

9.     Securing Payment with Draft

Where LCs are not used, drafts are a secure mode for ensuring repayment. For projects extending over ten to fifteen years or more, drafts are prepared in advance for amounts synchronised with the due dates of the agreed instalments, all signed by the borrower in token of acceptance, and preserved by the lender. On the respective due date, the relevant draft is presented to the borrower, the scheduled instalment payment received, the draft discharged, dated, and handed over to the borrower in acknowledgment. The process is repeated until the last instalment is paid.

Based on present definition, letters of credit available by deferred payment do not envisage the concurrent use of bills of exchange. However, integration of bills of exchange into deferred payment credits could add considerable value in terms of security of repayment. Apart from the commitment under a letter of credit, an added protection would be afforded by the presence of the accepted but unpaid bill of exchange. One may argue that since the deferred payment transaction is under a letter of credit, the lender has protection by virtue of the presence of an LC.

However, establishment of claim, incidence of default, and breach of contract are long-winded affairs under any letter of credit. For the holder in due course, the presence of an accepted but unpaid bill of exchange can reduce the process considerably for reasons already stated. Further, when no LC is used in a deferred payment arrangement, what then? How is the lender supposed to be protected? Think drafts, think unconditional payment.

From a risk management point of view, an accepted draft in hand may be better than a deferred payment credit which is subject to the availability, capacity, and capability of the issuing bank to honour its commitment over the extended period.

10.  LCs Available by Acceptance

There is no conflict per se between the BoE laws on usance drafts and LCs available by acceptance. In both instances, a time draft is required. In the absence of clear direction in the UCP, the recovery process is set forth in the BoE Act for accepted drafts remaining unpaid at maturity. In both instances the amounts due are payable immediately on maturity.

However, it would be ridiculous to draw acceptance drafts on the issuing bank. Firstly, because after acceptance, the draft in most cases is not returned to the nominated bank but continues to be held by the drawee (issuing) bank itself. If it is to be used by the seller or their (financing) bank as evidence of non-payment on maturity, and the party to be sued is the issuing bank that originally accepted (and held) the bill of exchange, the whole scenario would be self-defeating in nature. The LC is an obligation of the issuing bank. The UCP rules and ISBP standards are well equipped to sort matters out in case of any difference of opinion (including refusal to pay) between the negotiating bank and the issuing bank. The simultaneous presence of a draft – one which calls for immediate payment (or on maturity) come what may – only muddies the scenario.

In the final analysis, the party in default should be the buyer/applicant – not the issuing bank that has anyway undertaken to pay under an LC on behalf of its client, the applicant. Making the issuing bank bind itself twice under two entirely different sets of rules and laws for the same transaction, instead of binding the buyer/applicant, makes no practical sense. Where exists a draft drawn on and accepted by the buyer/applicant, the drawer or holder can use all the forces of the BoE Act for recovery of money unpaid.

In LC transactions drafts should never be drawn on the issuing bank for acceptance. As explained earlier, it would place the issuing bank under the dual control of the UCP rules and also that of the laws governing bills of exchange. It is wise not to sail on two boats.

Hence, LCs available by acceptance of drafts on the issuing bank must go. UCP600 Article 6(c) should be modified accordingly. For usance transactions, time drafts should be drawn on the applicant (Swift Fields 42.A and 42.C). It would be the duty of the issuing bank to obtain acceptance and hold the same until maturity and final payment. Call it ‘LC available by delayed payment’, ‘Usance LC’, ‘Time LC’ or any other appropriate name.

A word of caution: The documentary credit community freely uses expressions such as acceptance, endorsement, at sight, after sight, and at maturity, without fully appreciating the fact that the UCP defines none of them; these terms are only defined in the Bills of Exchange Act.

11.  Is Draft Not a Document?

ICC Opinion TA.853rev (2016) states that: “A draft is an unconditional order in writing and not a document”. Is a draft written on sand, on water, or in thin air? Since “Banks deal with documents and not with goods, services or performance … .” (UCP600 Article 5), why then is draft included in documentary credit operations at all if it is not a document? Why is it called for in a documentary credit? ICC’s assertion about drafts seems absolutely illogical. Further, why, “If certain information is to appear on a draft, it must be specifically stated in the credit” (ICC Opinion TA.853rev)? That is what an LC does anyway by stipulating that “all documents must … .” How to reconcile the ICC Opinion TA.853rev conclusion with the UCP600 rules? What is the logic for making an exception in the case of drafts alone? None whatsoever, in my opinion.

How does one define an acceptance credit or a sight credit without reference to the underlying bill of exchange as the reference document?

The ICC has spent considerable time and energy explaining the irrelevance of drafts in trade finance operations. In January 2019 as part of a “Set of Guidance Papers on Recommended Principles and Usages around UCP 600 Rules”, the ICC produced a 13-page paper titled “Additional Material Relating to the Guidance Paper - the Use of Drafts under Documentary Credits”. Concurrently, ICC also released an abbreviated “Executive summary” on the topic claiming that: “[A] number of ICC National Committees and practitioners questioned whether drafts should be required for presentation under any documentary credit. Furthermore, it was highlighted that sight drafts do not provide any benefit to a nominated bank or issuing bank.” I suspect that the respondents did not study or analyse the BoE Act closely enough.

I hope that this essay on the Bills of Exchange Act helps in improving understanding of the role of drafts in documentary credit operations.

12.  An Analysis of ICC Findings and Positions

Before closing, it may be in order to review and comment on a few past ICC findings, positions it has taken, and a possible future direction.

1)     “However, it was clearly apparent from responses that a lack of understanding did exist in respect of the application and practice of UCP 600 within both banks and corporates.” (“Decision of the ICC in respect of a revision of UCP 600 following a comprehensive consultation”, 15 June 2017, ICC Document 470/1272.)

Spot on. I could not agree more. Yet strangely, the last portion of ICC’s paper on “Notes on the Principle of Strict Compliance, Issues Paper” (Document No. 470/1261) states that “as time goes by, it is customs and practice that will provide the required clarity. And once such customs and practice have become commonplace, they will form part of a future revision of ISBP.”

Should not the ICC lead the way rather than play catch-up? The ISBP are not rules! Whatever happened to revision of the UCP rules, the backbone of documentary credit operations? (Current version issued way back on 1 July 2007), Should not it be revised first? Real change will not come through tinkering with the ISBP standards from time to time.

2)     UCP600 Article 15 is weak in the sense that it provides no direction to banks to forward documents “without delay” or within “reasonable time”. Of course these parameters are determined by circumstances, but would not a moral suasion come in handy if and when disputes arise?[10]

Sub-section 76.1 of Canada’s Bills of Exchange Act,[11] states, “… when a bill payable at sight or after sight is negotiated, the holder must either present it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable time.” Section 76(2) states: “If the holder does not comply with the requirement of subsection (1), the drawer and all endorsers prior to that holder are discharged.” Now replace “holder” in the preceding quote with “nominated or negotiating bank” and re-read section 76(2) with this substitution.

3)     ICC Opinion R256 (1997) concludes by stating: “Any dispute as to the requirement and manner of “physical” acceptance is between the importer and the issuing bank based upon local banking practices and law.” Banking laws are centrally regulated and are applicable to a country as a whole. Qualifying them as “local” is incorrect if not mischievous.

4)     The matter of communicating acceptance could also have been easily sorted out if the ICC had referred to and clarified the laws on BoE in its response.

The relevant portion of the BoE Act 1882 (UK) Section 17 states as follows:

“17  Definition and requisites of acceptance.
(1) The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer.
(2) An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the following conditions, namely:
(a) It must be written on the bill and be signed by the drawee. (Emphasis added)
The mere signature of the drawee without additional words is sufficient.“ ....

SWIFT MT754 is for advising payment, acceptance, or negotiation. It does not convey or confirm that a draft has been physically accepted in accordance with the applicable law. Why couldn’t these extracts from the BoE Act be highlighted to clear the air?

5)     Two past ICC Opinions issued under UCP500 seem particularly problematic.

(a)   ICC Opinion TA480rev states:

“[I]t is recognized that where sight drafts are to be drawn on the issuing bank, the requirement for the presentation of such draft is often crucial for the issuing bank to obtain payment from the applicant.”

Comment: Where the sight draft is drawn on the issuing bank, it becomes the drawee. Consequently, under the BoE Act, the drawee (the issuing bank) is obliged to pay at sight or on demand, not the applicant which is not a party to the draft. Hence, the remark, “such draft is often crucial for the issuing bank to obtain payment from the applicant” is misplaced and irrelevant.

(b)   ICC Opinion R205 states:

“If an issuing bank insists on issuing a credit calling for drafts on the applicant, such drafts will be considered as an additional document. This means that the draft on the applicant will be construed as being an “accommodating draft” for the use by the issuing bank and not as the “instrument” that would control payment obligations of the issuing bank under the documentary credit. It will not be treated as the primary bill of exchange demanding payment or acceptance, but just as any other document for accommodation by the issuing bank in its relationship with the applicant outside the documentary credit mandate.”

The BoE Act (UK) Section 28 defines ‘accommodation bill or party’. However, nowhere in this Act or those enacted by other countries reviewed, is there an expression called “accommodating draft”. What is the origin of this term?

ICC Opinion R205 also states that an “(accommodating draft) will not be treated as the primary bill of exchange.” Under which section of the law? Further, “the draft on the applicant will be construed as being an “accommodating draft” …. but just as any other document for accommodation …”. Once again, based on which section of the applicable law is this being stipulated? Can a draft ever be just “any other document for accommodation” even when drawn in accordance with Bills of Exchange law?

If in accordance with this article time drafts are allowed to be drawn only on the applicant (buyer), the areas of confusion are likely to disappear.

13.    Action Points for ICC

While advocating for a complete rewriting of UCP600 to make it less complicated for users worldwide, I offer these specific suggestions:

a)     UCP600 Article 2: Restructure item (c) under the definition of ‘honour’;

b)    UCP600 Article 2: Re-define ‘Negotiation’ to mean giving of value (payment of money) under a mandate by a third party. Purchase or discount, consequently, will mean giving of value under the sole discretion and judgment of the bank (financing institution) parting with funds.

c)     UCP600 Article 2: Add definitions for ‘deferred payment’, and ‘deferred payment credit’;

d)    UCP600 Article 2: Remove references to ‘draft’ and ‘agreeing to advance funds’[12];

e)     UCP600 Article 6(b): Remove ‘sight payment’ and ‘acceptance’;

f)     UCP600 Article 7(a): Remove all references to ‘sight payment’ and ‘acceptance’;

g)    UCP600 Article 7(a)(i): Delete ‘sight payment and ‘acceptance’. Replace with ‘honour’;

h)     UCP600 Article 7(a)(ii): Replace ‘sight payment’ with ‘negotiation’;

i)      UCP600 Article 7(iv): Delete;

j)      UCP600 Article 8: Similar action points as suggested for Article 7;

k)     UCP600 Article 12(b): Delete.[13]

l)      UCP600 Article 14(g): Revise and expand wording of sub-Article to state: “A document presented but not required by the credit will be summarily disregarded and will be returned to the presenter without further examination of the document as per the provisions of the UCP or any action for documents required by the credit. This rule also applies to drafts drawn on the issuing bank, confirming bank or the nominated bank.”

m)   UCP600 Article 15: Insert ‘without delay’ at the end of each of the three sub-articles.

n)     Remove all references to drafts from the ISBP for reasons already explained. Drafts are not subject to any rule or “local banking practices”, but are governed by legislations.

14.    Benefits

In my view, implementation of these suggestions will:

  1.  Remove all confusion about the usage of drafts;
  2.  Make ‘negotiation’ easier to understand;
  3.  Remove the confusion between ‘available by payment’ and ‘available by negotiation’;
  4. Relieve the documentary credit of the baggage (dual authority) carried by it for so long, resulting in legal simplification;
  5. Remove many chokepoints by simplifying and streamlining the UCP and the ISBP.

This article brings the horse to the water. The big question now is, will the horse drink? Let us hope that it does.

A word of caution:

The UCP should be fully revised before any attempt is made to revise the ISBP. Doing the opposite will be an exercise in futility. The tail cannot wag the dog.

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While introducing my article "The road map to draft-free UCP" published in the May 2025 issue of Documentary Credit World (DCW), Chris Sandler[14] remarked thus:

“Despite decades of tension between drafts and documentary credits, the ICC has yet to fully untangle the bill of exchange from UCP rules. In this meticulous article, Rupnarayan Bose outlines the legal supremacy of BoE law over ICC practice, the operational confusion that results, and the hazards of forcing banks to “sail in two boats.” From defining sight and deferred payment to dissecting ICC Opinions and their logical gaps, Bose makes the case for an overdue course correction: cut drafts from UCP600 and update the rules for the realities of modern finance.”

Very succinctly put. Yes, this article offers solutions to several tricky issues that the ICC had been grappling with for decades. The article follows.

Trivia: It took me about 5+ months of continuous work on it to put together my thoughts on the subject the way I wanted to.

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[1] First published in Documentary Credit World issue of May 2025. https://www.doccredit.world/the-road-map-to-a-draft-less-ucp/?ref=dcw-monthly-newsletter

[3] Other jurisdictions with law similar to the UK Act include, but are not limited to, Canada (Bills of Exchange Act 1985), Ireland (Bills of Exchange Act 1882), Kenya (Bills of Exchange Act), Australia (Bills of Exchange Act 1909), and Abu Dhabi (Bills of Exchange Act 1882, updated Dec 2020).

[4] http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688253/3689003/3709973/index.html

[5] Refer to my article ‘Some random thoughts on the UCP’, Chapter 1, Beyond Trade Finance, Notion Press, 2021

[6] Zhongmin, Zha. 2023. “Bills of exchange in a letter of credit”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg, University. Law 2: 531–541. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2023.216

[7] Zhongmin, Zha. 2023. “Bills of exchange in a letter of credit”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law 2: 531–541. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2023.216

[8] Quoted in the Guidance Paper’s “Introduction”, page 24, Set of Guidance Papers on Recommended Principles and Usages around UCP 600 Rules.

[9] Source: Zhongmin, Zha. 2023. “Bills of exchange in a letter of credit”. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Law 2: 531–541. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu14.2023.216

[10] This flaw was pointed out in “Wanted: a more positive article 15”, chapter 18 of the book “Beyond trade finance”, Notion Press, 2021.

[11] https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/b-4/page-1.html

[12] To know more, refer to articles on ‘negotiation’ in the book ‘Beyond trade finance’, Rupnarayan Bose, Notion Press, or Amazon websites.

[13] For an explanation, refer to ‘Prepayment, honour and bills of exchange’, chapter 11, ‘Beyond Trade Finance’, Notion Press, 2021;

[14] Chris Sandler is the COO of the Institute of International Banking Law & Practice (IIBLP), the organization which produces DCW.

Monday, September 28, 2026

Revisiting the roots of the global financial crisis[1]

Part one

Should a lunatic run the asylum, a poacher become the gamekeeper or a regulator switch loyalties at will? The answer may appear obvious, but the reality could be different. Let us find out.

I first set foot on African soil in early 1998 when I took over charge of a commercial bank in East Africa. It was privately owned. Its chairman, who was also its major shareholder, was an industrialist –the second-largest plastic goods manufacturer in East Africa. He was a Kenyan citizen of Indian origin, a Gujarati whose parents had migrated to Kenya before he was born. There were about one hundred thousand people from the Indian sub-continent, known as Asians, who had made Kenya their home and contributed significantly to the economy of the region. As is usual for Asian-owned banks, it had major exposure to the local Asian community in terms of its general business mix, particularly its lending portfolio. The bank, small in size, was well-regarded in Kenya.

The chairman was an entrepreneur at heart. He had built up his plastic business from scratch. He was similarly determined to build up his banking venture. He was closely involved with both, and split his daily routine to make sure that he was involved in the decisions taken at his factory as well as at his banking set up. As part of his routine, he held two Board meetings a week at the bank. Yes, these were regular Board meetings, including agenda items, minutes of past meetings, action taken reports and everything else. Present at these meetings were two of his local directors (partners in his plastic company), and the bank’s top management, i.e. my general manager and myself. At these meetings all papers and decisions taken by us were reviewed by him. He also spent the first half of every working day at the bank – overseeing operations and meeting the bank’s customers. The Central Bank of Kenya did not approve of his style of functioning, but one just couldn’t keep him away from his bank.

My cabin was on the same floor. All the customers that visited us waved at me and walked on to the last cabin to meet the chairman. They knew where the real power lay, and who the dummy was. I often wondered what I was supposed to be doing there.

To go back a little, some of the rich Asians with money to burn set up finance companies for two-wheeler financing. The business model was simple, straightforward and need no special expertise. But then, like all finance companies, they became unmanageable and the Central Bank of the country gradually got worried with the way things were being handled at these finance companies. So, one day, these finance companies received letters from the CBK to the effect that they would have to convert themselves to banks, and strictly follow from day one all the norms of a commercial bank. The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) had decided that it was far easier to control and regulate a banking entity than a non-banking finance company (for which there were practically no way to regulate them).

Some of these finance companies converted themselves into commercial banks, but continued to finance two-wheelers as they had done all along. Others appointed professional bankers and tried to conduct banking business. I was the second MD and CEO to adorn this bank’s chair, simply because the CBK wanted it that way. In his heart, the chairman who had created this institutions had no intention to loosen his grip over it. He did not trust external “professionals” to run his bank.

At one of these regular meetings the issue taken up for discussion was the penal rate of interest lately imposed by the bank on the defaulting borrowers. The chairman said that several of his customers (read, his friends and peers in the Asian community) had complained to him that the (penal) interest rates were too high; they hurt, and that the bank should do something about them. On behalf of the bank I explained that the penal rates were meant to be punitive – much higher than the normal rates. They were meant to act as deterrents or disincentives to potential defaulters, to keep their numbers as low as possible and thus improve the overall quality of the bank’s loan portfolio. The main objective of a penal interest was not to increase the bank’s income, but to impose financial discipline on the borrowers.

The chairman had another issue to discuss. He said that some customers had to resort to frequent overdrawing of accounts, but were inconvenienced since they had to approach the bank every time they needed to draw beyond their sanctioned limits. He suggested that the bank should sanction 25 to 30 per cent over and beyond the quantum estimated after appraisal, to avoid frequent reporting to the Central Bank of Kenya, and inconvenience to his customers (not necessarily in that order!). While on the subject, he also made it known that he did not appreciate the bank (read, us) requesting the borrowers to visit the bank to execute loan documents. Why couldn’t we, by way of customer service, visit their offices instead at their convenience to execute security documents? Could we also be extremely polite while writing letters to defaulters, non-performing borrowal account holders, or even while calling up bad loans, so that the bank did not hurt their sensibilities?

The issue uppermost in his mind was the fact that his peers were unhappy with him and his bank. They had complained to him at various social gatherings (probably in the presence of his other friends) that his bank was severely penalising them for occasionally stepping over the line, for frequent irregular drawings, or for failing to repay on schedule. The chairman strongly felt that such irregularities were normal to every business. A bank (especially a bank owned by a fellow Asian) was supposed to be ‘understanding’, rather than exploit these situations to inconvenience or penalise the borrowers to increase profit. As the owner of the bank, he was in a position to lend a helping hand, offer financial assistance, to the fellow members of his community; which he always did. However, by treating his peers as it did, the bank was effectively undermining his position. In being strict, he felt that the bank was letting him down, badly.

It was not very difficult to understand where he came from. His plastic manufacturing company enjoyed large financial facilities from other banks in Nairobi. As a customer, especially as a borrower, he knew exactly where the shoe pinched. Unfortunately, even as the chairman of the bank, he continued to wear the hat of a bank’s customer/borrower. For him, the Chinese wall between his profession as an industrialist and as the owner of a bank did not exist. It was well-nigh impossible for him, therefore, to step into the shoes of a banker or think like one. Consequently, he did not realise as the chairman of the bank where his loyalty should lie.

If it is difficult for an industrialist to think like a banker just because he happened to own a bank, it could be even more difficult for the ‘regulated’ to wear the hat of a ‘regulator’, for the poacher to become the game-keeper. For them, the so-called Chinese wall may never exist.

Part two

The lines, unfortunately, are blurred in the US too. There, the business lobby has a huge influence on the government and its members. Being a lobbyist is a well-recognised profession. Those who are major contributors to the campaign or election funds of politicians (it is perfectly legal) bring to bear significant influence on the legislations by the US law makers. Cross-functional mobility is easy. Lucrative assignments with attractive compensation packages await some of those who leave the government. Under such circumstances, it is debatable whether one can totally switch loyalties, effect a completely changeover – body and soul – to being a regulator from one who earlier was one among the ‘regulated’.

It would serve no purpose listing the movers and shakers in the US financial markets who later occupied positions of influence in the US government, or those who left the positions of influence in government to join private enterprise for handsome gains. We focus here only on one such who is widely believed to have made a major contribution to the 2008 global financial crisis. His name is Phil Gramm, a Republican from Texas and a Ph. D in economics. Before he entered politics in 1970, he taught at Texas A & M University. “Some people look at sub-prime lending and see evil. I look at sub-prime lending and I see the American dream in action,” he famously said.

He was the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee from 1995 through 2000. His seat on the Senate banking committee quickly won him support from the nation’s major financial institutions. Many of his deregulation efforts were backed by the Clinton administration. Other members of Congress — who collectively received hundreds of millions of dollars in campaign contributions from financial industry donors over the last decade — also played their respective roles. From 1989 to 2002, the US federal records show, he was the top recipient of campaign contributions from commercial banks and in the top five for donations from Wall Street. He and his staff often appeared at industry-sponsored speaking events around the country. Everything legal and above-board, of course.

But, where did his loyalties really lie? After going through the rest of this article, if you begin to wonder whether lunatics should run the asylum, you have my sympathies. The details of his zealous performance are now in the public domain. Here is a snapshot, for you be the judge.

From 1999 to 2001, while the US Congress considered steps to curb predatory loans, Phil Gramm did everything he could to block the measures. In 2000, he refused to have his banking committee consider the proposals, an intervention hailed by the National Association of Mortgage Brokers as a “huge, huge step for us.” A year later, he objected again when Democrats tried to stop lenders from being able to pursue claims in bankruptcy court against borrowers who had defaulted on predatory loans.

He played a leading role in writing and pushing through Congress the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Called The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the measure was the most significant financial services legislation since the Great Depression. It removed barriers between commercial and investment banks that had been instituted to reduce the risk of economic catastrophes. The Act split up regulatory supervision of conglomerates among government agencies. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, would oversee the brokerage arm of a company; bank regulators would supervise its banking operation; state insurance commissioners would examine the insurance business. But no single agency would have authority over the operations of the corporate in it entirety. Neither was there any attention given to how these regulators were to interact with one another. The single biggest failure of the system was that nobody looked at the holes of the regulatory structure. Gramm thereby created what Wall Street analysts now refer to as the “shadow banking system,” an industry that operated outside any government oversight.

A year later, the U.S. Senate rushed to pass the 11,000-page government reauthorization bill. Gramm slipped into it a 262-page amendment. In what one legal textbook would later call ‘a stunning departure from normal legislative practice,’ the Senate, at the urging of Texas Senator Phil Gramm, tacked on a complex, 262-page amendment called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). Into this Act, Phil Gramm inserted a key provision that forbade federal agencies to regulate the financial derivatives, and exempted over-the-counter derivatives such as credit-default swaps from regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). His proclaimed objective was to "protect financial institutions from overregulation" and "position our financial services industries to be world leaders into the new century."

Holiday season was approaching. Everybody was in a hurry to wind up proceedings. No one had the time or the patience to go through the last-minute additions and amendments. The bill along with the Gramm amendments were passed without much debate.

The legislation created what was later named as the "Enron loophole". It contained a provision – lobbied for by Enron – that exempted energy trading from regulatory oversight. It allowed Enron – a generous contributor to Gramm election fund – to run rampant, wreck the California electricity market, and ultimately cost consumers and shareholders billions before it collapsed. But for Phil Gramm, Enron was a family affair. Eight years earlier, his wife, Wendy Gramm, as CFTC chairwoman, had pushed through a rule excluding Enron's energy futures contracts from government oversight. Wendy later joined Enron’s board, and in the following years her Enron salary and stock income brought between $915,000 and $1.8 million into the Gramm household. Incidentally, Enron’s CEO Ken Lay chaired Gramm's 1992 re-election campaign.

In 2002, Mr. Gramm left Congress, joining UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland) as a senior investment banker and head of the company’s lobbying operation. UBS had been able to acquire investment house PaineWebber due to his banking deregulation bill. At UBS, he was helping persuade lawmakers to block Congressional Democrats’ efforts to combat predatory lending. UBS later became one of the subprime crisis' top losers.

“They are saying there was fifteen years of massive deregulation and that’s what caused the problem,” Mr. Gramm said of his critics. “I just don’t see any evidence of it.” Said Mr. Phil Gramm in an interview, “By and large, credit-default swaps have distributed the risks. They didn’t create it. The only reason people have focused on them is that some politicians don’t know a credit-default swap from a turnip”.

Phil Gramm’s comments after the Commodity Futures Modernization Act were approved – along with other landmark legislation he had authored – by the US Congress are worthy of note: “The work of this Congress will be seen as a watershed where we turned away from an outmoded Depression-era approach to financial regulation and adopted a framework that will position our financial services industry to be world leaders into the new century,” Gramm said.

The financial disasters that cropped up frequently (including the dot-com bubble) only went to prove how hollow these big talks were. The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in July 10, 2010. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, it was “the most comprehensive set of reforms to our financial system since the Great Depression.” The act made sweeping changes throughout the financial regulatory system including new regulations for systemically important. But when the basic norms of banking are given a go-bye, things happen.

Author’s notes: The 2008 global financial crisis may be a distant memory now. The global economy may have recovered from the financial Tsunami that was precipitated post-2008. But, as Sir Winston Churchill famously said, “Those that fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Banks in the US have failed again and again, as this website[2] shows. As recently as since 10 March 2023, two US banks viz., Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank, collapsed. These were the biggest bank failures since 2008. (Do remember that SVB was neither a commercial bank nor an investment bank. It observed no risk management practice either.) Credit Suisse, another bank in deep crisis, reportedly mismanaged, was bailed out by the Swiss authorities who brokered the bank’s emergency sale to UBS for 3 billion Swiss francs over a weekend. “The issues at Credit Suisse are to do with a long history of revolving doors at the top of the firm in management terms, a changing plan, and on top of a series of operational risk and control and compliance problems.”[3] Sounds familiar?

The contagion effect affected Deutsche bank, the financial stress throwing up its own fault lines. The crisis may have been contained for the time being, but history has a nasty habit of repeating itself.

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28-March-2023

 



[1] This article was originally written in September 2009, now updated.

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_bank_failures_in_the_United_States

[3] Mark Yallop, chairman of the U.K.’s Financial Markets Standards Board.